

# Computational Problems in Domination

- Identifying strategies dominated by a pure strategy (done)
- Identifying strategies dominated by a mixed strategy
- Identifying strategies that survive iterated elimination
- Asking whether a strategy survives iterated elimination under all elimination orderings
- We'll assume that  $i$ 's utility function is strictly positive everywhere (why is this OK?)

# Constraints for determining whether $s_i$ is strictly dominated by any mixed strategy

$$\sum_{j \in A_i} p_j u_i(a_j, a_{-i}) > u_i(s_i, a_{-i}) \quad \forall a_{-i} \in A_{-i}$$

$$p_j \geq 0 \quad \forall j \in A_i$$

$$\sum_{j \in A_i} p_j = 1$$

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- **What's wrong** with this program?
  - **strict inequality** in the first constraint means we don't have an LP

# LP for determining whether $s_i$ is strictly dominated by any mixed strategy

$$\begin{array}{ll}
 \text{minimize} & \sum_{j \in A_i} p_j \\
 \text{subject to} & \sum_{j \in A_i} p_j u_i(a_j, a_{-i}) \geq u_i(s_i, a_{-i}) \quad \forall a_{-i} \in A_{-i} \\
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- This is clearly an LP. **Why is it a solution** to our problem?
  - if a solution exists with  $\sum_j p_j < 1$  then we can add  $1 - \sum_j p_j$  to some  $p_k$  and we'll have a dominating mixed strategy (since utility was assumed to be positive everywhere)
- Our original approach works for very weak domination
- For weak domination we can use that program with a different objective function trick.

# Identifying strategies that survive iterated elimination

- This can be done by repeatedly solving our LPs: solving a polynomial number of LPs is still in  $\mathcal{P}$ .
  - Checking whether every pure strategy of every player is dominated by any other mixed strategy requires us to solve at worst  $\sum_{i \in N} |A_i|$  linear programs.
  - Each step removes one pure strategy for one player, so there can be at most  $\sum_{i \in N} (|A_i| - 1)$  steps.
  - Thus we need to solve  $O((n \cdot \max_i |A_i|)^2)$  linear programs.

# Further questions about iterated elimination

- 1 **(Strategy Elimination)** Does there exist some elimination path under which the strategy  $s_i$  is eliminated?
- 2 **(Reduction Identity)** Given action subsets  $A'_i \subseteq A_i$  for each player  $i$ , does there exist a maximally reduced game where each player  $i$  has the actions  $A'_i$ ?
- 3 **(Uniqueness)** Does every elimination path lead to the same reduced game?
- 4 **(Reduction Size)** Given constants  $k_i$  for each player  $i$ , does there exist a maximally reduced game where each player  $i$  has exactly  $k_i$  actions?



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  - ③ **(Uniqueness)** Does every elimination path lead to the same reduced game?
  - ④ **(Reduction Size)** Given constants  $k_i$  for each player  $i$ , does there exist a maximally reduced game where each player  $i$  has exactly  $k_i$  actions?
- For **iterated strict dominance** these problems are all in  $\mathcal{P}$ .
  - For **iterated weak or very weak dominance** these problems are all  $\mathcal{NP}$ -complete.